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A Problem of Social Capital and Cultural Norms?
By Salaam Yitbarek*
Abstract
This paper asserts that in Ethiopian society, there exist certain cultural norms or
‘dysfunctional behaviours’ that inhibit effective communication, lead to intra-group
conflict, and make conflict resolution difficult. This has resulted in a diminished capacity
for cooperation and a dearth of social capital and civil society, which does not bode well
for development and democracy. It is imperative that research is expanded in the
neglected area of cultural norms and social capital in Ethiopian society, and that
intervention strategies are designed to increase social capital by addressing cultural
norms directly through social marketing, awareness raising, and other mechanisms.
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“If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must develop
and improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions spreads.”
Alexis de Toqueville, 1988. Democracy in America.

Introduction
Much of this paper is based on my anecdotal observations of and experiences within
Ethiopian collectives of various sorts, mostly in the diaspora, but also in Ethiopia. This is
not a formal ethnographic study, but a discussion paper whose aim is to put forth a thesis,
raise pertinent questions, and most important of all, encourage much-needed research and
practical development work around the area of cultural norms and social capital in
Ethiopian society.
Over years of interacting with fellow Ethiopians in group settings, I have found that, in
general, Ethiopian collectives tend to be ineffective, inefficient, and short-lived.1 Some
mundane examples: Meetings, formal or informal, are invariably disorganized,
unproductive, and never-ending. Group members are often late to meetings and
appointments (but if the meeting or appointment involves a non-Ethiopian participant,
they are careful to be on time). Communication is opaque and communications skills
generally poor. Feuding and infighting are rampant. There is a constant and chronic
manifestation of intra-group conflict—personal conflict among individuals or sub-groups
within the collective—for which it is often difficult to find rational explanations. There is
an absence of effective conflict resolution, and so these conflicts escalate and eventually
reach a point of no return. Over time, the collective degenerates into a forum for personal
conflict, begins losing its members as they feel increasingly alienated, and becomes
incapable of fulfilling its mandate, with the final result being group paralysis and then
collapse.
This type of caricature of Ethiopian group dynamics is not uncommon among Ethiopians
in the diaspora, mainly because we get to participate in and observe non-Ethiopian
collectives, especially mainstream (North American or European) collectives, and make
the inevitable comparisons.2 We find that most mainstream groups tend to work relatively
well. Members are punctual and meetings functional. Communication is usually seamless
and transparent. There is little avoidable conflict, and what conflict occurs is easily
resolved with an evidently strong aptitude for conflict resolution. All in all, mainstream
groups tend to be quite effective in fulfilling their mandates to the satisfaction of their
individual members and the group as a whole.

1

Parts of this paper are based on the article, “Time to Declare War on Dysfunctional Behaviors,” that I had
published under a pseudonym at http://www.ethiomedia.com/carepress/dysfunctional_behaviors.html.
2
Complaints about punctuality, pessimism about the effectiveness of groups, expressing reluctance to ‘get
involved’ in collectives of any sort and similar sentiments can be heard in everyday conversations amongst
Ethiopians. A lucid example is Weichegud’s (pseudonym) weblog entry, “A Tale of Two Meetings,” at
http://weichegud.blogspot.com/2006/09/tale-of-two-meetings.html.

2
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Given this experience, I, like many others, have asked myself why Ethiopian collectives
are relatively weak and rife with conflict. Is this a problem only with certain types of
collectives; say, political interest groups? In my experience, no. Chronic intra-group
conflict occurs in all types of Ethiopian collectives—families, extended families,
professional associations, churches, local community organizations, traditional
associations, charity organizations, as well as political interest groups. Are these conflicts
based on real and tangible reasons, such as differences in outlook or interests? No, I have
observed virulent conflict within homogenous groups consisting of individuals with
seemingly similar needs and wants, interests, perspectives, frames of reference, and
ideologies. Most interesting of all, I have found little difference in the propensity and
nature of conflicts that occur within collectives in Ethiopia and those in the Ethiopian
diaspora. This despite the fact that Ethiopians in the diaspora have relatively higher levels
of education than those in Ethiopia, live in relative prosperity, comfort, and freedom, and
in their everyday lives get to experience the ample examples of effective collectives
found in the mainstream community.3
These observations have led me to believe that there are certain underlying cultural
norms and behaviours in Ethiopian society that inhibit effective communication, lead to
intra-group conflict, and hamper conflict resolution. I call these ‘dysfunctional
behaviours’. These behaviours exist in all societies to some degree or another, but I
believe their preponderance in Ethiopian society explains the relative weakness of
Ethiopian collectives. In this paper, I describe these dysfunctional behaviours and their
underlying norms, relating them to findings on Ethiopian society as expressed in
mainstream academic literature. This is followed by a discussion of the concept of social
capital in the context of this paper. I explain that these behaviours and norms make
voluntary cooperation and group work difficult by retarding the development of the ‘art
of association’, hence, stifling social capital. Finally, I suggest avenues for research and
development work this area, and suggest that intervention strategies designed to increase
social capital and civil society should include ways of addressing these cultural norms
directly through social marketing, awareness-raising, and other intervention mechanisms.

Dysfunctional Behaviours
Most of the behaviours discussed below are identified on the basis of my lived
experience. They are inter-related and interdependent, and have in common the property
of inhibiting collaboration and cooperation, either through hampering effective
communication, promoting conflict, or hindering conflict resolution.

3

The education numbers are surprisingly high—according to the 2000 U.S. Census, 30% of Ethiopians in
the U.S. have a bachelor’s degree or higher, and over 60% have some post-secondary education.
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1. Personalization of issues
This is the inability to conceptually distinguish between a person and their ideas
or thoughts. Criticism of another’s position or ideas, or even endorsement that
happens to be lukewarm or not enthusiastic enough, is perceived as a personal
slight or attack instead of an objective assessment of the idea at hand. Often, to
save face and honour, the ‘offended’ party must promptly respond in kind. This
response occurs usually through the means of a veiled but well-understood insult.
Again, for the sake of honour, this insult cannot go unanswered, and a destructive
cycle of communication ensues, with what should have been a constructive
discussion or debate quickly descending into personal conflict. Once a
confrontation has begun, the participants are loath to retreat from their positions,
as that would be seen as weakness by colleagues, ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ alike.
People seem especially prone to such behaviour in group settings. Being
contradicted in front of others is especially damaging, embarrassing, and is seen
as devaluing of one’s reputation. “How dare you disagree with me in everyone
listening?” or “Why did you not support me in front of all those people?” is a
common sentiment. Again, no difference is observed between people and ideas.
Obviously, this leads to dysfunctional group dynamics. Group members become
reluctant to discuss ideas openly and in clear terms, knowing that any positions
taken are likely to result in confrontation with some parties or other. Ideas are not
properly discussed and vetted, and much time is spent avoiding, heading off, or
healing personal rifts. Communication deteriorates, severely handicapping the
group, often to the point of making it useless, both objectively and from the point
of view of the participants.

4
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2. Parochialism
There is a pronounced tendency to irrationally favour those from one’s own kin or
‘side’ no matter what the cost. For example, continuing with the above theme, say
that during a meeting, a disagreement occurs over a particular issue of debate and
the disagreement devolves into personal conflict. When parochial instincts kick
in, the participants in the meeting quickly begin to take sides in the conflict. They
may choose to side with a friend, family member, relative, co-worker, neighbour,
member of the same ethnic group, etc. The conflict is extended from personal to
sub-group, following the same set of norms that foster traditional blood feuds
(dem, in Amharic).
What is most interesting is the ease with which these groups form. Damtew et al
(2005) remark that “kin groups cooperate much more significantly in this respect
(organizing for parochial confrontation) than in economic matters”. In the absence
of obvious dividing lines—say, all participants are from the same family—
dividing lines will be sought and found!4 The instinct for confrontation and
defence overcomes the very raison d’être of the greater group. The reason for the
meeting, the topic of discussion, and the need to avoid or resolve conflict are all
forgotten.
As sub-group conflict is much more difficult to resolve than personal conflict,
parochial instincts end up causing enormous damage to collectives. Once rival
sub-groups begin to form and solidify, the very existence of the collective is
threatened.

4

“This parochialism is manifest in diverse ways in the different social strata,” writes Levine (1965).
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3. Mutual suspicion and mutual distrust
While observing or participating in meetings or any other occasion for group
dialogue, I have noticed that far too often, even the most innocuous and harmless
remarks are interpreted as insults or personal attacks. For example, during a board
meeting, a director-at-large makes a statement about having to tighten finances,
and various participants around the room automatically assume he is pointing his
finger at them. One of them makes a sharp retort, perhaps with some veiled
remarks intended to personally attack the initial speaker. A personal conflict
begins to brew. For the detached observer, the situation can be confusing. What
brought about the conflict? The first speaker was not addressing anyone in
particular, so why did the second react in a hostile manner? And why does
everyone else seem not so confused?
Such episodes seem the result of Ethiopians’ tendency to view each other first and
foremost as potential threats. With such a heightened level of suspicion and
threat-awareness, any expressed idea or thought, no matter how innocuous, is
considered to have ulterior motives behind it. As such, even the most innocent
comments by the closest of friends can be misinterpreted as intentionally
offensive, resulting in the breakup of previously fruitful relationships.
Interestingly, the Amharic language contains many proverbs reflecting suspicion
and distrust, e.g. YalTereTere YemeneTeral (“He who is not vigilantly suspicious
will be displaced from this land”), Amno Qebro new (“Trust only the dead and
buried”), and Sew meTTa neger yemeTal (Namni dufu dubbin dufa in Afan
Oromo, “A man has come; a quarrel will come”).5 These proverbs serve to
indicate the prevalence of mutual suspicion in Ethiopian society.
Needless to say, general distrust weakens collectives. In my experience, it makes
group work so difficult and tedious that members end up devaluing their
collective and eventually withdrawing participation.

5

The last proverb and Afan Oromo translation is from Cerulli (1923).
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4. Paranoia
Here, what is meant by paranoia is mutual suspicion and distrust taken to the
extreme. As everyone is viewed as a threat, individuals tend to develop a
disproportionately paranoid outlook in their interactions with others. With the
‘threat’ foremost in mind, sinister plots are imagined to be all around and a
‘conspiracy theory’ mindset is cultivated.
“Yalsema joro ke gorebet gar yTalal (He who does not pay attention and listen
fights with his neighbour),” goes the Amharic saying, one interpretation being: A
person who does not pay careful attention to the talk around him ends up
assuming that it is malicious gossip about him, and goes to his neighbour to
retaliate. It is the assumption part that is most interesting; that is, how the person
errs on the side of assuming conspiracy.
A significant side effect of paranoia is that it hinders self-reflection. One’s own
contribution to a given state of affairs and one’s responsibility and ability to
change it is ignored.6 All focus is on external parties that are considered the sole
causes of the problem.
5. Lack of empathy and empathetic understanding
In my experience, a large part of the deficit in listening and communications skills
in Ethiopian collectives is due to the absence of empathy and empathetic
understanding. Rarely have I found people in the course of dialogue considering
questions such as “what is causing him to behave this way”, “how might his
background or perspective be influencing his thoughts”, or “what would I have
done were I in his place”. Even rarer is the practice of ‘suspending judgement’ or
giving others the benefit of the doubt (whether consciously or sub-consciously).
Instead, judgements are made hastily and with incomplete information, with the
‘judge’ not having taken the time to try to empathize with the speaker or consider
all the variables in play. This not only leads to ‘communication gaps’ or
misunderstandings, but inevitably leads to conflict, especially when combined
with tendencies toward mutual suspicion and distrust.

6

This is a partial reflection of the ‘renowned Ethiopian fatalism’ discussed in Messay (1999), starting at p.
173.
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6. Character assassination
Rather than addressing conflict or even potential conflict directly, I have found in
Ethiopian collectives a tendency for members to chronically spread rumours
(often fantastic) and innuendo about those with whom they disagree or perceive
themselves to be in conflict.
Interestingly, character assassination turns out to be an effective weapon against
one’s perceived enemies. Mutual suspicion and a lack of empathetic
understanding means that people tend not to give each other the benefit of the
doubt, but rather believe the worst about each other! With people already
suspicious of each other, a defamation campaign simply ends up confirming
existing suspicions.
In my experience, there is a strong awareness of how lethal character
assassination is, and so people in conflict, or in anticipation of conflict, begin lowlevel defamation campaigns as a defence mechanism. The conflict intensifies and
turns into a character assassination war, which, of course, greatly reduces the
chances that any sort of resolution will take place.
When such a conflict occurs in a collective, it is often cancerous. Reputations
being at stake, the conflict is bound to escalate and absorb other participants,
putting the collective at grave risk. This is an often seen pattern in Ethiopian
collectives.

8
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7. Lack of openness
Rarely does one observe open and frank communication amongst Ethiopians. As
Levine (1965, p. 251) writes, the idea is to “Avoid binding commitments;
maximize the degrees of freedom left after any utterance.” In general, there is an
extreme reluctance to be open and forthcoming, and an expectation of the same
guarded approach from others. Indeed, frank expression of one’s thoughts is often
derided as somewhat backward, childish, naïve, or even dangerously indiscreet.
Dangerous not only to the speaker, but also to the group to which he belongs. It is
almost as though if the group’s ‘secrets’ are let out, it will be exposed to dangers
from without, dangers that a chronically suspicious mindset imagines to be clear
and present.
The general lack of empathy, by making people afraid of being judged hastily and
incorrectly if they speak openly and unambiguously, contributes to the hesitation
to be open. This fear leads people to be initially vague, unclear, and noncommittal, which inevitably leads to communication gaps and breakdowns as
others engage in the complicated and error-prone exercise of trying to interpret
the hidden meaning of what was said. Again, because of the suspicious mindset,
the interpretation often turns out to be negative.
The unholy trinity of mutual suspicion, lack of empathy, and lack of openness
renders effective communication very difficult. People are afraid of being
incorrectly judged, speak ambiguously, their statements are interpreted
negatively, and this in turn legitimizes their initial fear, and so on.
8. Holding grudges
Even after declaring forgiveness for some perceived slight, people continue to
steadfastly hold on to personal grudges and hope and plot for vengeance. How
often I have heard people say something like, “I forgive her, but I don’t want to
see her (face) again.” It seems that though forgiveness is a norm to be aspired to,
it is in practice too difficult to attain.7
Understanding or forgiveness of perceived affronts is seen as a loss of honour and
a sign of weakness. In a group context, I have often witnessed an extreme
reluctance both to apologize for and to forgive even the smallest incident. This, of
course, makes group interaction difficult; mistakes and conflict are bound to arise,
and holding on to grudges makes them hard to resolve.

7

Levine (1965, pp. 81-83) has more on what I call the conflict between what ‘should be done’ and ‘what is
done’ in Ethiopia. That is, the extent to which a society adheres to its own formally established norms.
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9. Envy
The proverbial totem pole seems to be all-important in Ethiopian society. Relative
rank is much more important than absolute. People destroy others’ property or
reputations, or even each other, with nothing to gain for themselves personally,
except the consolation that they are now relatively better off than their victim.
I was once privy to a conversation between an old and wise widower monk and a
novice monk, in which the latter was explaining that the bout of ill health he was
recovering from was caused by an evil spell. The story was that some time before,
a visiting priest asked all the monks for their names so that he could pray for them
in his daily prayers. Some gave him their names, he wrote them down, and the
next day, left the monastery. Shortly thereafter, this novice monk fell ill, and he
suspected that the priest had used the paper he had written the monks’ names on
the cast an evil spell. The wise monk was sympathetic but firmly admonished the
novice. “How could you give him your name?” he asked, “One should only ever
divulge one’s baptismal name!” (A spell cannot be cast using a baptismal name.)
Note that both monks consider it is perfectly normal for people to do harm to
others out of the blue and with no benefit to themselves; in fact, while putting
themselves at risk. And note the advice of the senior monk: to be always vigilant
and chronically suspicious.
Such envy is an outgrowth of an ingrained perception that everything in life is a
zero-sum game.8 If someone is rich, it is because another is poor. If someone is
happy, it is because another is sad. It is as if the world has been alloted a fixed
amount of wealth, happiness, etc., and it has been ordained that everyone should
have more or less the same amount. Failing this, the ones with more must have
committed some kind of crime or evil act to improve their lot, and the ones who
have less must be cursed.9 These attitudes are reflected in the Amharic saying: Ke
guadegnochua yebeleTech mashela le wef temechalech (“A millet stalk grown
taller than its ‘colleagues’ attracts the birds”).
Envy complicates social relationships and therefore group dynamics. As the
example above illustrates, it goes hand in hand with mutual suspicion, making it
difficult to develop a culture of cooperation.

8

Foster (1965), in his famous paper, writes that the ‘image of the limited good’ or zero-sum perception is
characteristic of many peasant societies.
9
Platteau (2001, p. 4) and elsewhere talks about ‘egalitarian’ or ‘other-regarding’ norms in societies where
resources are or have traditionally been perceived as being scarce. Those who succeed outside of the norm,
such as the classic ‘dynamic farmer’, are sometimes forced into self-exile as they cannot stand the
downward pressure on them. These exiles form the ‘immigrant entrepreneur’ class in their new homes.

10
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10. Stubbornness and lack of compromise
The zero-sum view of the world leads many to view compromise as weakness. In
the context of a win-loss game, compromise is a loss. Anyone who makes the
slightest move towards negotiation or concession is perceived by adversaries and
onlookers as weak. The response to conciliatory gestures then, instead of being
reciprocally conciliatory, is retrenchment, in order to take advantage of the
perceived weakness. A win-win scenario, with compromise as a building block
for establishing solid relationships that will be mutually beneficial in the future, is
scarcely envisioned.
Such thinking is anathema to the very basis of conflict resolution, which is the art
of finding win-win situations.
Before proceeding further, a note of clarification; some may claim that many of the
norms and behaviours are properly attributed to particular segments of Ethiopian society,
notably the ‘Abyssinians’ (normally the Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups or
nationalities), given the analysis in much of the literature (Levine 1965, Levine 2000
[1974], Korten 1971, Crummey 1980, and others). Many of the above norms and
behaviours are partially associated with the ‘hierarchical-individualistic with weak
horizontal ties’ properties commonly attributed to Amhara and Tigray society. Whereas
the Oromo, for example, are commonly characterised as communal (as opposed to
individualistic), practicing ‘egalitarian collectivism’, and having somewhat different
cultural norms in this regard (Levine, 2000 [1974]).
Though inter-ethnic differences are certainly relevant, there are two points to be made in
this regard. First, it is probably safe to say that what is called Amhara/Tigray culture
forms a significant part the greater Ethiopian society, either because of the ‘domination’
thesis, or because of intrinsic cultural commonalities and interplay among the various
ethnic groups and nationalities, or both, depending on one’s perspective.10
Second, these dysfunctional behaviours are not all necessarily tied to hierarchicalindividualistic societal structure. Though this paper does not speak on all traditions—
there are over eighty ethnic groups or nationalities in Ethiopia—it is fair to say that these
behaviours and norms do apply to some degree to other ethnicities with different
structures. For example, the first behaviour, ‘personalization of issues’, mainly concerns
the art of communication and may be common throughout Ethiopia. Consider the
following scenario: a meeting of elders under a shady tree which, among various ethnic
groups, is a classic setting in which conflict resolution is practiced. Consensus is a
requirement and voting an alien concept. The issues on the agenda are often impossibly
delicately broached, with everyone, as much as possible, choosing their words carefully.
Disagreements are to be addressed indirectly and no one is to be directly contradicted.
Antagonism, or even hints of antagonism, is to be avoided at all costs. All this because
there is an underlying problem—a tendency for disagreements to become personal and
10

According to the last (1994) population census in Ethiopia, out of the eighty or so ethnicities or
nationalities in Ethiopia, the Amhara (30%) and Tigray (6%) together form a little more than a third of the
population. The Oromo (32%) form the simple majority.
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quickly escalate into unsolvable conflict! Add to this parochialism and the holding of
grudges, and the ultra-sensitive approach becomes quite understandable. In this context,
the idea of a vote, which in some cases may render the most efficient solution, would be
unthinkable.
So though inter-ethnic differences certainly exist, it is perhaps the similarities that are
more relevant. Most importantly, in the context of this paper, the idea is that throughout
Ethiopia, though perhaps in different shades and at different levels, some subset of the
above dysfunctional behaviours exist and ought to be addressed.

Social Capital
The concept of social capital has gained marked popularity in social science literature
over the past fifteen years or so. Partly because it is a newly popular term, and partly for
other reasons discussed below, it has several definitions, many of which have several
topologies and dimensions, and it used in different ways by various parties in various
contexts. Indeed, there are probably as many papers about the definition of social capital,
its scope, and even its usefulness as a concept, than there are on social capital research
per se!11 So, a good place to start is with a brief primer on social capital, including the
various interpretations of it. Then we will be in a position to put social capital in its place
within the context of this paper; that is, to illustrate how it is how it is related to culture,
specifically values, norms, and behaviour, and civil society, development, and
democracy.
We begin with Putnam et al, since their work, the most oft-cited piece in social capital
literature, is often credited for starting the recent social capital trend. They define social
capital as:
“… (the) features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions.” (Putnam et al, 1993, p. 167)
This definition was developed based on discoveries they made while studying the
efficiency of regional governments in Italy. In the course of their research, they found
“dramatic differences in institutional performance” between the regional governments in
Northern Italy and those in Southern Italy, with those in the North functioning much
better than those in the South. Putnam et al explain these differences by the gap in civic
tradition between the two areas. In the North, there were more social networks, voluntary
associations, greater participation in civic and political associations, less free-riding on
public goods, etc. At the same time, Putnam et al found values and norms such as trust,
reciprocity, honesty, reliability, and collaboration were much stronger in the North than
the South. In other words, they found more social capital in Northern Italy than Southern
Italy. They conclude then that the relatively low level of social capital in the South
11

Much of this section is based on Woolcock (1998), Woolcock and Narayan (2000), Adam and Roncevic
(2003), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004), and Dasgupta (2005), who give a good summary of the evolution of
social capital over the past decade.
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accounts for its inefficient regional governments, generally poor institutional
performance, and democratic deficit. Their broader conclusion is that social capital has an
important positive role in strengthening democracy.
While Putnam et al’s definition of social capital gives a reasonable encapsulation of the
concept, it also leaves plenty of room for interpretation. Trust, norms, and networks are
complex ideas, and one can imagine many other features of social organization that
facilitate coordinated actions. There are indeed “different types, levels, or dimensions of
social capital, different performance outcomes associated with different combinations of
these dimensions, and different sets of conditions that support or weaken favorable
combinations” (Woolcock, 1998, p. 159). Below is a condensed explanation of the
commonly discussed dimensions of social capital:
1. Micro- and macroAn individual can have social capital—high levels of interpersonal or social trust,
norms such as reciprocity, a wide network of friends, acquaintances, colleagues in
various collectives, strong ties, etc. A group can have social capital, for example,
a strong internal network of ties. And by the same token, whole societies and
nations can have social capital; Northern Italy vs. Southern Italy in Putnam et al’s
example. Micro-level social capital often applies to individuals or groups,
whereas macro-level applies to social capital at the national or sub-national level.
2. Bonding and bridging (also known as strong and weak ties).12
Bonding refers to social capital within collectives, or inter-group social capital.
For example, the strength of network ties within an ethnic entrepreneurship class,
say Chinese-American small businesses. Bridging refers to social capital between
collectives, or intra-group social capital, say between the Chinese-American small
business community and mainstream businesses or markets.
3. Externalities and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ social capital
A farmers’ labour support group (the Ethiopian wenfel, for example) increases the
agricultural returns of its members and is likely a net benefit for its members. A
criminal gang like the Mafia also gives some benefit to its members. However,
the wenfel probably has positive externalities—effects on non-members or society
at large—whereas the Mafia certainly has negative externalities. This is what is
commonly meant by good and bad social capital. Note, however, that the wenfel
or any other example of seemingly good social capital can also have negative
externalities, if, for example, it has characteristics of being strongly exclusionary
or parochial.13
4. Civil society and social capital
Civil society is the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests
they hold in common—not for profit or exercise of political power.14 Social
12

The terms ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ are used extensively in the literature; Woolcock and Narayan (1998,
p. 320) give a good introductory summary.
13
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004, p. 15) give a general explanation and list some studies that illustrate
potential negative externalities to strongly parochial manifestations of social capital.
14
This is what the World Bank considers its simplest definition, as found in Edwards (2000).
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capital is a broader and more fine-grained concept. By definition, norms and
networks are present in all realms where collectives of any nature, informal or
formal, large or small, exist. So, social capital, for instance, trust and friendship
networks, can create or enhance civil society, for example, a grassroots
neighbourhood association. At the same time, one would expect that the existence
of vibrant civil society, all things being equal, to increase social capital by giving
people practice at collective action.
5. Cognitive (e.g. trust, norms, shared values) and structural (e.g. networks)
Trust, norms, shared values, attitudes, beliefs, and the like are conceptually
different from networks. The former, cognitive social capital, are derived from
mental processes and reinforced by culture and ideology (Uphoff, 2000). The
latter, structural social capital, describes the composition of social interactions
themselves. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the two categories of
social capital. Cognitive and structural social capital are interdependent—for
example, trust increases an individual’s propensity to link with others or join a
network, and the practice of being in a network or group helps individuals become
more trusting.15
Figure 1. Complementary categories of social capital

Sources and
manifestations

Domains
Dynamic factors
Common elements

Structural
Roles and rules
Networks and other interpersonal
relationships

Cognitive
Norms
Values
Attitudes
Beliefs
Civic culture
Trust, solidarity,
cooperation, generosity

Procedures and precedents
Social organization
Horizontal linkages
Vertical linkages
Expectations that lead to cooperative behavior, which
produces mutual benefits

Source: Uphoff (2000)

This brief outline of the various dimensions of social capital shows that it can be
considered to be, more than a concept, a praxis, “a code word used to federate disparate
but interrelated research interests and to facilitate the cross-fertilization of ideas across
disciplinary boundaries” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004, p. 3). It is often said that the best
feature of social capital is that it has enabled the various disciplines interested in
development issues, primarily sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists on one
15

There has been a long-standing concern about social capital’s heterogeneity. Many lament the confusion
resulting from one term having so many meanings, as well as methodological problems such as difficulties
in isolating and measuring cognitive social capital and ambiguous causality between the two categories.
There are also concerns about the reliability of macro studies for various reasons, among which is the
strength of the surveys they are based on. For these reasons, there is a trend to try and limit the definition of
social capital to, for example, just micro networks. For more on this, see van Deth (2003), Dasgupta (2005)
and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004).
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side, and economists on the other, some common language. The sociologists et al get to
inject more ‘social’ into development discourse, while submitting more of their ideas to
the type of quantitative rigour appreciated by economists. At the same time, economists
gain more appreciation for the ‘social’ and get to be able to measure it via social capital.16
In the same vein, the popularity of social capital has also helped boost the role of
‘culture’ in development, culture defined simply as “… the common world of
experiences, values, and knowledge that a certain social group constitutes and reproduces
in their daily life” (Löfgren, 1981, p. 30, quoted in H. Vermeulen, 2001, p. 3). Cognitive
social capital—norms, values, and attitudes such as trust, honesty, cooperation, and
reciprocity—is part of culture. Those who believe that ‘culture matters’ to some extent or
another to economic growth, development, and democracy now have a way of injecting
their ideas in more quantitative terms into the development realm by using the concept of
social capital. In other words, “Social capital… (becomes) a utilitarian way of looking at
culture” (Fukuyama, 2002).
And this is the role of social capital in this paper—to buttress the idea that norms, values,
and attitudes affect development. In the theoretical realm, there is a good argument that
social capital produces benefits for individuals, households, and societies, with ‘benefits’
meaning anything from greater household income to a higher Human Development Index
to better governance (Fukuyama, 2002, presents a succinct explanation). In a society
where norms of mutual trust and reciprocity are strong, voluntary groupings of people,
from basic two-person associations to civil society organizations (CSO’s) tend to be
easily formed, are effective, and enduring. These norms also strengthen social, economic,
and political institutions, which are keys to development. Finally, they enable people to
effectively articulate and assert their interests, which is the essence of democracy.17
In the empirical realm, research on social capital, including cognitive social capital, is in
its infancy and still in the process of achieving methodological soundness, but what there
is of it does give significant support for the above conclusions. Some examples: Putnam
et al (1993) (notwithstanding criticisms) conclude that greater social capital, including
cognitive social capital such as trust, results in better governance and democracy. Knack
and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) show that at a national level, trust has
positive impact on economic growth. Paxton (2002) shows that social capital (with trust
as one component of social capital) is a determinant of the level of democracy in nations.
On the micro level, Krishna (2001) shows that participation, trust, solidarity, and
reciprocity result in, among other things, less poverty and more employment prospects.
Uphoff (2000) explains how an increase in cognitive social capital, brought about by an
educational campaign, resulted in Pareto-optimal use of a shared irrigation system that
had hitherto been inefficiently utilized. Mogues (2005) finds that bonding and bridging
social capital among households in rural north-eastern Ethiopia has a positive effect on
asset holdings and mitigates the impact of income shocks on livestock capital Again, it is
16

Bebbington et al (2004) and Edwards (2000) provide a thorough analysis of the ‘social capital effect’
among development specialists in general and especially at the World Bank.
17
On the other hand, the absence of these norms results in social atomization, which permits
authoritarianism, or generally, democratic deficit.
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worth noting that empirical research on social capital is still at an early stage, though
promising links have already been made between social capital and development and
democracy.

Discussion
Recall that the dysfunctional behaviours attributed to Ethiopian society—personalization
of issues, parochialism, mutual distrust, paranoia, lack of empathy, character
assassination, lack of openness, holding grudges, envy, and stubbornness—have negative
effects on communication, conflict, and conflict resolution. These behaviours are
obviously antithetic to the norms that promote social cooperation, such as trust,
reciprocity, collaboration, openness, and the like. A society in which these dysfunctional
behaviours are the norm has, by definition, relatively little social capital.
Given this, the next question is: Are these dysfunctional behaviours and their underlying
cultural norms, values, and attitudes really significant characteristics of Ethiopian
society? There is much in the anthropological and sociological literature on Ethiopian
society that supports this thesis. Many of these dysfunctional behaviours were noted over
forty years ago in Levine’s (1965) seminal work. He found that these behaviours were
part of a society characterized by rugged individualism, suspicion, fatalism, ambiguity,
etc., a society with norms not conducive to collective effort. Concerned about how such a
society would respond to modernity, he wrote, “…modernization is unthinkable without a
significant increase in solidaristic sentiments and rationalized organization” (Levine,
1965, p. 283). Many of Levine’s conclusions regarding ‘hierarchical-individualistic
structure’ and ‘weak horizontal ties’ (Levine, 2000 [1974]) being properties of Amhara
society are echoed by other Ethiopianist researchers. Messay (1999, p. 250), adding to
Levine’s above statement, writes, “In effect, the Ethiopians are ill equipped for
organizing strikes with the view of defending or obtaining collective rights.”18 Crummey
(1980, pp. 123-124) talks about hierarchical patron-client ties overriding any horizontal
ties (among the peasantry). Habtamu (1994), in a psychological study of university
students in Addis Ababa, finds mutual distrust one among several negative characteristics
in Ethiopian society. Korten (1971) finds that Ethiopian folktales reflect a view of life as
a zero-sum game and writes, “Perceived opportunities for initiative and cooperation in
service to the community are limited.”
There are criticisms of the above characterizations of Ethiopian society which, for the
purposes of this paper, are grouped into two broad categories. The first is based on
ideological/theoretical grounds—mainly that Levine’s approach in particular is outdated
structural-functionalism and that talking about culture in this way smacks of cultural
determinism or essentialism (Tesfaye, 2004, and Harrison, 2002, give brief criticisms).19
18

Messay continues, “The movement quickly decomposes, mostly by the influence of vertical calculations
on the part of leaders and influential participants. Above all, the Ethiopians do not feel ashamed or
dishonored by the failure, as communal obligations have little value for them.”
19
Tesfaye does point out that there is still no ‘full-scale and systematic’ critique of Wax and Gold in the
literature, though the book is over forty years old and has been a major influence on many works. Harrison
expresses legitimate concern about what might be a perception of a homogenous ‘Abyssinian culture’; this
is addressed in the ‘Dysfunctional Behaviours’ section above.
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Most of these concerns revolve around the eternal culture vs. structure debate: the
question of culture being a determinant, dependent, or in between. There seems to be a
fear of ‘culturalism’—that to think about culture in development at all will lead to it
being abused, conflated, treated as homogenous, unchanging, and all-determining.
Indeed, the past decade or so has seen works such as Culture Matters (Harrison and
Huntington, 2000) and The Central Liberal Truth (Harrison, 2006) that argue the thesis
that culture may be the greatest determinant in a society’s development. The latter goes
so far as to list universal cultural traits common to all underdeveloped societies (some,
incidentally are similar to our dysfunctional behaviours). However, the existence of such
perhaps excessive arguments should not deter us from giving culture its due in
development discourse—it is here to stay.20 There is a reasonable position to take on the
culture debate, which is that culture matters to some extent or another. As Sen (2004)
writes, “The real issue…is how—not whether—culture matters.”
The second criticism is on practical grounds—that Ethiopian society does not display the
above characteristics, or at least not to any greater extent than other societies. Tesfaye
(2004) holds up the wenfel as a robust example of solidaristic association among the
Amhara peasantry in the area he studied. Tesfaye contends that the wenfel is more than
just a farmers’ labour support group: it is a generalized form of institutional social
reciprocity, similar in its pervasiveness to the Chinese guanxi. Wenfel permeates all
aspects of peasant life, including agricultural and non-agricultural work, social events,
and other contexts in which social relationships are manifested. Other well-known forms
of traditional social capital in Ethiopia are rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs - equb), religious social support groups (mehaber), various farmers’ labour
sharing arrangements (debait, jige, debo), and burial societies (iddir).
But of course, the mere existence of these voluntary associations does not imply that the
assertion that Ethiopian society is hierarchical-individualistic with weak horizontal ties is
false. After all, Putnam et al’s Southern Italy does contain some voluntary associations.
ROSCAs (e.g. djangi in Cameroon), labour-sharing arrangements (e.g. kombi in Sierra
Leone), burial societies (e.g. diswaeti in Botswana), and similar associations exist in most
parts of Africa and the developing world, and in many traditions. In 1950’s Japan, rural
communities typically had an average of fifteen to twenty-five voluntary associations
(Norbeck, 1972)! Social capital and voluntary associations exist to some extent
everywhere—the question is about their relative quality and quantity.

Conclusion
The thesis of this paper is that there are certain cultural norms, ‘dysfunctional
behaviours’, in Ethiopian society, both in the diaspora and in the homeland, that hamper
effective communication, lead to intra-group conflict, and inhibit conflict resolution.
These behaviours make cooperation difficult, and so, by definition, inhibit social capital
and the growth of civil society, and by extension, democracy.

20

Apthorpe (2005) and Vermeulen (2001), both hardly cultural determinists, provide good explanations as
to why culture can no longer be ignored and about the real and imagined dangers of culturalism.
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This being a discussion paper, the purpose behind its perhaps provocative thesis is to
raise questions and encourage further research. I suggest the following lines of inquiry:
1. Are these dysfunctional behaviours really characteristics of Ethiopian society?
What is their impact? Forty years after Wax and Gold, there is certainly room for
a re-evaluation, affirming or critical.
2. What is the state of social capital in Ethiopia? How does it compare with
elsewhere? New, robust tools, such as better surveys, are being developed that
might make cross-country studies of social capital more reliable than they are
now.
3. What is the state of social capital among Ethiopian immigrants in developed
countries? How do Ethiopian immigrants compare with other immigrant groups in
their host countries, in terms of social capital and other variables? The diaspora is
an excellent laboratory for research, both from the point of view of logistics, and
because it so beautifully constrains many variables. It also has the potential to
allow certain inferences to be made of the culture of immigrants in their native
countries.21
4. Assuming the dysfunctional behaviours thesis is true, can these behaviours be
addressed and how? What sort of intervention strategies would be effective in
bringing about change? Unlike advocacy for other types of cultural change, such
as changing customs or practices, few would overtly resist the teaching of basic
habits to help promote effective communication, conflict prevention, and
improved conflict resolution practices. How can we use this to our advantage?
How can social marketing be effectively used for these purposes? What is the role
of development practitioners and native Ethiopian institutions such as religious
organizations and governments? I think that the role of native Ethiopian
institutions in this regard is absolutely crucial. As Levine (1965, p.51) writes,
“The vitality of a people springs from feeling at home in its culture and from a
sense of kinship with its past. The negation of all those sentiments acquired in
childhood leaves man adrift, a prey to random images and destructive
impulses…The most productive and liberating sort of social change is that built
on continuity with the past.”

21

H. Vermeulen (2001) and F. Vermeulen (2005) present thorough discussions of culture in the context of
immigrant studies.
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